Introduction U.S. presidential campaigns dominate national media attention during increasingly long periods before election day. Presidential campaigns deliver messages by way of television, radio, mail, and online media with a goal of persuading voters to support their candidate and mobilizing supporters to turnout on election day. Early studies of the persuasiveness of campaign were characterized by findings of minimal effects. Most voters made their minds up before the general election campaigns and they did not often change their minds once decided. Campaigns exerted little influence when it came to changing the mind of voters about whom to vote for. Still, other studies find evidence that campaigns enable learning by voters. Despite limited evidence of persuasive effects, many studies find evidence of campaign effects with respect to mobilization and turnout. Through field experiments and the randomization of get out the vote (GOTV) messaging, decades of studies have documented the ability of campaigns to increase turnout. Recent studies, sometimes in conjunction with campaigns, have brought voter files-large databases of citizens voting history sometimes supplemented with additional information-to bear on questions of voter turnout. Through the use of field experiments and with advances in data and modeling techniques, studies have increasingly identified consistent evidence that through advertisement and other mobilization efforts, campaigns may successfully bring voters to the polls. In addition to the campaign's effect on voters, we consider campaigns as institutions. We consider studies that examine the determinants of presidential campaign strategy. The effects of presidential elections are not limited to the periods before election day. While campaigns target voters with goals of both persuasion and mobilization, the electoral motivations driving campaigns influences governing after the last inaugural ball is over. The incentives of presidential campaigns are defined by the electoral institutions of the office. Namely, the Electoral College and the all-or-nothing allocation of electoral votes in all but two states incentivizes candidates-turned-presidents to favor the same states they targeted in campaign. We consider studies that examine how campaign forces drive the policies that presidents pursue. From federal grant spending to disaster aid, the specter presidential campaigns persist into governing.
Research and Teaching Resources
The resources below may be used both to assist researchers new to the subject of presidential campaigns in familiarizing themselves with extant scholarship and learning about important data sources, and to aid instructors in planning courses on presidential campaigns.
General Overviews These overviews can serve both as primers for researchers to acquaint themselves with major themes and theories pertaining to presidential campaigns and as primary texts for college-level courses. Boller 2004 includes historical accounts of each presidential election from 1789 to 2000, and discusses how presidential campaigns have changed over time. Along the same lines, Craig and Hill 2011 presents various historical and empirical accounts of the driving factors behind electoral outcomes. Campbell 2008 and Holbrook 1996 provide detailed studies of campaign effects in presidential elections from the minimal and not-so-minimal effects perspectives, respectively (see also Jacobson 2015). Karabell 2000 recasts Truman's 1948 victory over Dewey as the last campaign where candidates represented the full spectrum of ideological diversity before the television changed how political campaigns operated. Sides and Vavreck 2014 applies prevailing theories of presidential campaigns to the 2012 presidential election in real-time. Polsby et al. 2015 and Sides, Shaw, et al. 2015 are styled as traditional textbooks providing students with key factual knowledge and theoretical perspectives important for understanding presidential campaigns.
Offers a wide assortment of documents and data relating to the presidency, including the Public Papers of the Presidents and campaign speeches, statements, and press releases from major party presidential candidates.
Campaign Effects on Vote Choice
Whether and to what extent campaigns can influence vote choice is a long standing question in the study of presidential campaigns. While some studies conclude that campaigns only have minimal effects since individual preferences are relatively stable during the election season and between years, other studies suggest that campaigns play an active role in persuading or informing an individual's vote choice. The following two subsections these theories of minimal effects and persuasion, respectively.
Limits of Campaign Effects
The minimal effects paradigm suggests that campaigns exert negligible influence on individual-level vote choice and the outcome of presidential elections. Early research on voting behavior from the 1940s to the 1960s provides the foundation for this minimal effects perspective, suggesting that individuals' social relationships and partisan affiliations are indicative of vote choice (e.g. Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee 1954; Campbell et al. 1960) . Consistent with previous research, Finkel 1993 finds that party identification during the summer before the election and the perception of incumbent performance are reliable predictors of vote choice. Hill et al. 2013 , focusing on the relative strength and duration of television ads effects, finds that presidential advertisements have little effect on vote choice. However, though campaigns do not matter much to vote choice, they help individuals understand how their preferences map onto the candidates and parties active in the election (Gelman and King 1993 Campaigns Effects on Participation Compared to the study of campaign effects on vote choice, scholars express greater consensus in support of the ability of campaigns to influence political participation, from media advertisements to ground game organizing and door-to-door canvassing. The following subsections will explore the extent to which campaign activity can encourage or inhibit political participation.
Effect of Campaign Advertising on Participation
One of the primary activities that campaigns use to mobilize participation on a wide-scale is the use of campaign advertisements. Substantial evidence exists that advertising effects are not uniform when it comes to mobilizing individuals. Using information about intention to vote before the election season, Hillygus 2005 finds advertisements can influence turnout intention for those who identified as no intent to vote. Furthermore, the content of the advertisement may serve to mobilize a particular segment of the electorate (M. P. Claibourn and Martin 2012). Many studies argue that all political advertisements do not encourage participation uniformly, but that the effect of advertisements on participation vary given the advertisement's tone. While some studies find evidence that negative advertising mobilizes political participation (Goldstein and Freedman 2002; Clinton and Lapinski 2004) , others conclude that negative advertising depresses participation (Krupnikov 2011).
Michele P Claibourn and Paul S Martin. "Creating Constituencies: Presidential Campaigns, the Scope of Conflict, and Selective Mobilization". Political Behavior 34.1 2012, pp. 27-56. Using the National Annenberg Election Study and the Wisconsin Advertising Project, finds that campaigns may target messages to specific groups to stimulate participation. Certain symbolic messages (morality and crime) tend to have a strong appeal than one that center around material messages like taxes and social programs. Challenges the idea that negative advertisements lead to a demobilization effect. Their experiment finds that no statistically distinguishable relationship exists between negative advertisements and a decrease in voter turnout. The data shows, however, little evidence that negative advertisements mobilize turnout conditioned on respondent characteristics and the content of the advertisement.
Ken Goldstein and Paul Freedman. "Campaign Advertising and Voter Turnout: New Evidence for a Stimulation Effect". Journal of Politics 64.3 2002, pp. 721-740. Exploiting new data, which systematically tracks and catalogs campaign advertisements that aired in the 1996 presidential election, the authors examine the extent to which positive and negative advertisements affect voter turnout. The analysis suggests that positive advertisements have no effect while negative advertisements have a significant positive effect at mobilizing voters. Investigates whether and how campaigns may change an individual's intent to vote and how specific campaign activity might be more effective than others. Using data from the 2000 presidential campaign, finds that campaign activity can increase the predicted probability of intention to vote for both intended voters and nonvoters.
Yanna Krupnikov. "When Does Negativity Demobilize? Tracing the Conditional Effect of Negative Campaigning on Voter Turnout". American Journal of Political Science 55.4 2011, pp. 797-813 . Taking into account previously ignored factors about the temporality of the intervention, negative advertisements generally have no effect. However, a significant effect appears when the advertisement is viewed after the individual has identified their preferred candidate and the negative message is directed at that candidate.
Effect of Other Campaign Activity on Participation Advertisements are not the only tool campaigns use to stimulate participation among the electorate. A candidate's ground game, or grassroots/get-out-the-vote effort, is lauded by many in the media as a major factor in determining who wins presidential elections. Social scientists like Enos and Fowler 2016 observe that a strong ground game and individual voter contact can go a long way in spurring voter participation (Kramer 1970; Hillygus 2005; Masket 2009 
Learning and Priming
In discussions of campaign effects, one controversial issue has been the debate between priming versus learning. On the one hand, many social scientists argue that campaign effects are seen primarily through priming issues in which voters respond. On the other hand, researchers like Lenz 2009 contend the perceived priming effects are actually learning. Priming occurs when the media or campaigns cause a shift in voter perceptions or vote intention by bringing attention to a specific issue or event while is regarding others. The priming theory presupposes that voters have an ingrained predisposition that may be activated to change evaluation or preference of candidates. Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee 1954 cite how Truman won the election by using campaign messages to shift the electorate's thinking from international issues to domestic policy. Campaign's use of priming has been well documented in internal memos and analysis of polls (Druckman, Jacobs, and Ostermeier 2004) . M. Claibourn 2008 shows how candidates can use repetitive campaign advertisements to solidify possible long-term connections between the issue and the candidate using repetition. Other research suggests that subtle racial cues have robust priming effects which affect candidate preferences ( Argues that candidate's focus on specific issues through repetitive campaign advertisements (frequency) facilitates the long-term connection between that candidate and the issue-area. This long-term priming effect might make it easier for citizens to hold leaders accountable in the future. Provides experimental evidence that subtle racial cues in campaign advertisements can prime viewers and predict candidate preferences. Government taxation and expenditure language invoke racial considerations, especially when connecting blacks with the undeserving narrative. The findings also suggest that counter-stereotypical messages about black can subdue previous negative racial priming.
Consequences of Presidential Elections
While the clearest consequence of a presidential election is the immediate outcome-which candidate wins-, the results of presidential elections and the electoral institutions within which presidents and presidential aspirants compete influence the behavior of political elites and citizens in the mass public, the results of other elections, and a wide range of policy outcomes. The following subsections elaborate on the multifaceted ways in which presidential elections affect other components of the American political system.
Policymaking and Policy Outcomes
Presidential elections exert substantial influence on policymaking and policy outcomes because they both formally empower an individual as president, replete with formal and informal policymaking powers, and provide other political actors with a strong signal of public opinion. Consequently, newly-elected presidents often experience greater legislative success than they do later in their terms (Dominguez 2005) . Presidents also experience greater policymaking success when their election has enabled them to credibly claim a mandate (Conley 2001) or has convinced other political actors that they enjoy broad public support ( Seeks to explain the increase in presidents' appeals to electoral mandates since the 1970s. Argues that presidents employ mandate rhetoric to pressure recalcitrant partisan opponents when polarization is high and to compensate for a decrease in the legitimacy of the presidency after the Vietnam War and Watergate. Also asserts that mandate rhetoric has shifted from universalistic to partisan over time in order to mobilize copartisan supporters. Explores the existence of the "honeymoon effect" by comparing the presidents' legislative success in the first 100 days of the term to the same set of 100 calendar days in subsequent years of presidents' terms. Finds that presidents are more successful in passing preferred legislation in the first 100 days of the first year of the term, and that this effect is stronger under divided government. Examines how the types of rhetorical appeals made by the president condition legislative success. Finds that messages which focus on a president's electoral mandate do not influence legislative success.
Coattails
Given that presidential elections share the ballot with races for many other lower offices, scholars have long argued that presidential elections influence the outcomes of these down-ballot races-namely, that candidates for lower offices can "ride the coattails" of a successful presidential candidate. Most extant studies of presidential coattails focus on the consequences of presidential elections for congressional elections. Miller 1955 warns that studies of presidential coattails must carefully consider the measurement of this effect; in order for a coattails effect to be present, voters must have voted for down-ballot copartisans of the president because of the president's personal appeal. While Calvert and Ferejohn 1983 and Ferejohn and Calvert 1984 suggest that the presidential coattails effect weakened in the 1960s and 1970s, Mattei and Glasgow 2005 finds that the coattails effect has been consistently strong in more recent decades. Mattei and Glasgow 2005 and Mondak 1993 argue that the coattails effect is strongest in open-seat congressional races, as voters in these elections lack information about the candidates and use the partisanship of their preferred presidential candidate as a heuristic cue. Erikson 2016 asserts that the coattails effect weakens when a given presidential candidate is expected to win as voters seek to balance the president's power by electing non-copartisans to Congress. Campbell 2015 posits that the general pattern by which the president's party gains seats in Congress in presidential elections and loses seats in midterm elections is a consequence of higher turnout rates among presidential copartisans in the electorate and higher rates of support for the president's party among independents when the president is on the ballot. Seeks to explain the stylized pattern of the president's party gaining seats in Congress in presidential elections, but losing seats in midterm elections. Finds that the president's party performs better when president is on the ballot because presidential copartisans in the mass electorate turn out at higher rates and because independent voters swing to the president's party. Argues that the effect of presidential coattails is conditioned by voters' expectations of electoral outcomes; while voters who prefer a given presidential candidate are more likely to vote for the candidate's copartisans in congressional races, they will seek to balance the president's power by strategically voting for non-copartisan congressional candidates if their preferred presidential candidate is expected to win the election. Finds that the share of congressional seats won by the president's party increases as the president's own national vote share increases, but that the share of congressional seats won by presidential copartisans declines if the presidential candidate was expected to win. Argues that voters use their presidential preference as a heuristic with which to inform their congressional vote choice, and that the influence of this heuristic is strongest when voters lack information about congressional candidates. Finds that the magnitude of the presidential coattails effect varies across congressional districts, and that the effect of presidential preferences is largest on congressional candidate vote choice in open-seat elections.
Individual-Level Attitudes and Emotions
While presidential elections are perhaps most visibly consequential for policy outcomes and the composition of political institutions, electoral outcomes also have effects on the individual-level attitudes and emotions of citizens. Generally, these effects are conditioned by the success or defeat of individuals' preferred candidates; individuals who supported the losing candidate tend to experience adverse consequences as a result of the election outcome, as they exhibit diminished perceptions of political efficacy (H. Examines how voters update their political attitudes concerning the presidential candidates after the election takes place. Finds that voters perceive a greater difference in the candidates' relative attractiveness after the election than nonvoters, that voters who supported the losing candidate perceive less of a gap in the attractiveness of the two candidates after the election than do voters who supported the winning candidate, and that voters who perceived both candidates to be attractive prior to the election express a more substantial difference in the attractiveness of the two candidates after the election.
Michele P Claibourn. Presidential Campaigns and Presidential Accountability. University of Illinois Press, 2011. Argues that campaigns facilitate accountability by priming voters to evaluate the president's performance on the basis of his campaign priorities. Demonstrates that voters associate candidates with the issues they focus on during the campaign, and that presidential approval is weighed more heavily by the handling of issues the president emphasized as a candidate. Investigates the physiological effect of presidential election results on voters. Finds that voters who supported the losing candidate in the 2008 election, John McCain, experienced increased levels of the stress hormone cortisol immediately after the election results were announced, but that voters who supported the winning candidate, Barack Obama, exhibited stable cortisol levels over the same period of time.
Particularism Scholars long conceived of the president as a universalistic actor who represents the nation as a whole and promotes the general welfare of all. However, recent research argues that presidents, like members of Congress, are electorally motivated actors who pursue their electoral goals through particularistic behavior that benefits select constituencies, and that the president reaps electoral rewards for this particularism. Thus, presidential elections shape policy outcomes by incentivizing presidents to strategically distribute particularistic goods to electorally important constituencies. Reeves 2011 finds that presidents are more likely to approve requests for disaster declarations when they originate from electorally important states, and that presidents receive higher shares of the vote in states receiving these declarations (see also Gasper and Reeves 2011). D. L. Kriner and Reeves (2015b) extends this line of inquiry to encompass other federal policies over which the president can exert unilateral influence, such as the allocation of federal spending to counties, and finds similarly that presidents shape policies to disproportionately benefit copartisan supporters in swing states and core states, and that citizens rewards presidents for this particularistic behavior Examines the electoral consequences of natural disasters and the subsequent request for and approval of disaster declarations for governors and presidents. Finds that both governors and presidents are punished electorally for recent natural disasters, but that governors and presidents can effectively obviate these negative consequences by requesting and approving disaster declarations, respectively. John Hudak. Presidential Pork: White House Influence Over the Distribution of Federal Grants. Brookings Institution Press, 2014. Argues that presidents seek to promote their electoral goals by allocating larger amounts of federal grants to swing states. Utilizes quantiative data and elite surveys and interviews to help elucidate how the president exerts influence over the bureaucracy to direct the allocation of federal grants. Douglas L Kriner and Andrew Reeves. "The Influence of Federal Spending on Presidential Elections". American Political Science Review 106.2 2012, pp. 348-366. Explores the effect of federal spending on vote choice and aggregate outcomes in presidential elections. Using both county-and individual-level data, finds that the amount of federal spending a county receives is directly related to electoral support for the incumbent president or the presidential candidate who is a copartisan of the president. Douglas L Kriner and Andrew Reeves. "Presidential Particularism and Divide-the-Dollar Politics". American Political Science Review 109.01 2015, pp. 155-171. Uses federal spending data to demonstrate that presidents allocate federal spending in a particularistic manner, directing more money to counties in swing states and core states that provided strong support to the president in past elections. Further finds that particularistic spending behavior for counties in swing states is exacerbated in years proximate to a presidential election, and these swing state counties benefit the most from presidential particularism. Douglas L Kriner and Andrew Reeves. The Particularistic President: Executive Branch Politics and Political Inequality. Cambridge University Press, 2015. Examining allocations of federal spending, the provision of federal disaster aid, and patterns of military base closings, transportation grants, and trade protections, finds that presidents particularistically seek to provide benefits to copartisan supporters in core and swing states who are critical to presidents' electoral interests. Further demonstrates that voters in areas receiving particularistic benefits reward the president for his behavior. Finds that presidents use their authority to unilaterally modify trade protections in ways that enhance their electoral fortunes. Presidents are more likely to promulgate protectionistic unilateral directives in election years, and tailor these directives to benefit industries important to states in which the president does not have strong support. Andrew Reeves. "Political Disaster: Unilateral Powers, Electoral Incentives, and Presidential Disaster Declarations". Journal of Politics 73.4 2011, pp. 1142-1151. Demonstrates that presidents have been more likely to issue disaster declarations for electorally competitive states since Congress broadened their discretion to do so through the Stafford Act in 1988. Further finds that these declarations provide the president with an electoral benefit, as the president's electoral support increases by approximately one percent in states receiving one disaster declaration.
Jon C Rogowski. "Presidential Influence in an Era of Congressional Dominance". In: American Political Science Review 110.02 2016, pp. 325-341. Argues that presidential particularism is not a modern development facilitated by a growth in the power of the presidency, but that presidents were able to exercise particularistic behavior even in eras of congressional dominance. Focusing on the distribution of county-level post offices in the late 19 th century, finds that counties which strongly supported the president in past elections and which were represented by copartisans received more post offices than other counties.
Campaign Strategy
Presidential campaigns, as collectives of rational, goal-oriented individuals, carefully craft strategies which they expect will lead to victory for their candidate. The following subsections detail some of the key strategic considerations with which campaigns must grapple in pursuit of 270 electoral votes.
Resource Allocation Though presidential campaigns generate vast financial and organizational resources, these resources are finite, and campaigns must strategically allocate these limited resources across both states and the course of the campaign in order to maximize their chance of winning. Given the structure of the Electoral College, campaigns devise strategies which aim to win 270 or more electoral votes. Consequently, campaigns select states on which to focus their efforts on the basis of the number of electoral votes held by a state (Brams and Davis 1974), a state's electoral competitiveness (Colantoni, Levesque, and Ordeshook 1975) , the presence of other salient elections in the state (Shaw 2006), and other informational cues which indicate a state's electoral value and the feasibility of winning the state (see also Althaus, Nardulli, and Shaw 2002; Bartels 1985; Nagler and Leighley 1992; Reeves, Chen, and Nagano 2004; Shaw 1999b) . However, while both campaigns in a given presidential election often converge on similar state-level strategies (Shaw 2006), campaigns often adopt different strategies for within states, such as targeting copartisans or potentially persuadable voters (Chen and Reeves 2011). Hersh 2015 further suggests that campaigns' strategies within states are conditioned by the amount of voter information that states provide to campaigns; while campaigns can microtarget their direct contact efforts when they have access to detailed information, such as voters' partisan affiliations, they must rely on demographic heuristic cues to target geographic areas concentrated with likely supporters in the absence of such information. Examines how presidential campaigns' direct contact strategies across states are influenced by the richness of the voter information that states make available to campaigns. In information-poor environments, campaigns draw on heuristic demographic cues, such as gender and race, to identify geographic areas in which to focus direct contacting efforts. However, in information-rich environments, where states provide campaign with detailed voter-level information such as partisan affiliation and race, campaigns engage in microtargeting and focus their direct contacting efforts on copartisans and members of specific racial groups. 61.4 1999, pp. 893-913. Argues that presidential campaigns design their electoral college strategies using commonly-known information, such as a state's competitiveness, number of electoral votes, and cost of television advertisements. Finds that both Democratic and Republican candidates use these common sources of information to develop similar strategies, but that the strategic interaction of campaigns induces candidates to sometimes deviate from their strategies. Examines both the campaign strategies presidential candidates utilize and the effect of these strategies on voter evaluations. Demonstrates that presidential candidates rely on a standard set of criteria for determining to which states resources should be allocated, such as the presence of other salient elections and historical trends, and that campaign effects stemming from television advertising can be consistently observed when utilizing more granular units of time, such as weeks.
Messaging
Presidential campaigns have broad latitude in tailoring their campaign messages, and the success of a campaign can hinge on its ability to craft, present, and manage a "winning" messaging strategy. Petrocik 1996 argues that the Democratic and Republican parties "own" certain issues, such as social welfare and defense, respectively, and that presidential candidates succeed by framing the election in terms of issues that their party owns (see also Petrocik, Benoit, and Hansen 2003 1996, pp. 825-850 . Argues that parties "own" certain issues, such that voters associate certain issues with certain parties and perceive one party to better handle some issues than the other party. Further asserts that a presidential candidate perform best when she frames the election as a decision about an issue that her party owns, as voters will be more likely to support her because they expect her and her party to handle the issue better than her opponent. Explores the types of messages candidates focus on in presidential campaigns, and how candidates' messaging strategies influence election outcomes. Argues that candidates perform best when they emphasize issues for which they maintain a distinct comparative advantage; candidates who benefit from the current economic conditions are advantaged by running "clarifying" campaigns that emphasize the economy's positive performance, while candidates who do not benefit from the current economic conditions are better off running "insurgent" campaigns which emphasize a different issue that is already salient to the public and on which they have an issue position more attractive to the electorate than that of their opponent.
Vice-Presidential Selection While presidential nominees ostensibly seek to select competent running mates who share their policy preferences, vice-presidential nominees are often selected for the expected electoral advantage they will confer on the ticket. Sigelman and Wahlbeck 1997 suggest that vice-presidential Examines the relative importance of prospective vice-presidential nominees' experience and the perceived electoral home state advantage they would confer on the ticket in the running mate selection process during the convention era . Finds that prospective running mates from more competitive states, but not those with more governing experience, are more likely to be selected as the vice-presidential nominee. 
